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Abstract. In this paper we investigate the revolving doors phenomenon in the EU. In so doing, 
we propose a management approach which treats this phenomenon as a form of corporate 
political activity through which companies try to gain access to decision-makers. By using 
sequence analysis to examine the career paths of almost 300 EU affairs managers based in public 
and private companies across 26 countries, we identify three different ideal-typical managers: 
those EU affairs managers coming from EU institutions and public affairs, those who make a 
career through the private sector and those who establish themselves in national political 
institutions. This identification confirms our claim that EU institutions need different types of 
information and companies need EU affairs managers with different professional backgrounds 
able to provide it. Rather than observing a revolving door of EU officials into EU government 
affairs, we observe what we call sliding doors, namely the separation of careers, especially 
between the public and private sectors. 
Keywords: Corporate Political Activity; EU Lobbying; Revolving Doors; Public Affairs; 
Business and Government 
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Introduction 
In the US, the contemporary phenomenon of revolving doors represents the legacy of the public 
role businessmen and entrepreneurs have played since the New Deal. This phenomenon has been 
recognized and studied since the 1980s, chiefly from a political economy perspective. The focus 
of the analysis has been on the individual incentives of the manager/regulator to enter revolving 
doors and their macro effects, such as regulatory capture. Yet little is said on the business side 
and the mechanisms underlying the incentives of firms to hire managers with experience in the 
private sectors have been overlooked.  
In this work we propose a management approach to revolving doors by treating this phenomenon 
not as something unique but as a form of corporate political activity. Companies act in the 
political arena by exchanging resources with the public authorities for access to the decision-
making process. Recent American works on revolving doors suggest that managers with 
experience in the public sector provide firms with personal contacts, which in turn allow firms’ 
improved access to decision-makers. The political currency in the EU is, instead, information; 
companies need to provide EU institutions with different types of information. More specifically, 
EU institutions need information on European and national interests as well as expert knowledge. 
We investigate the choice of who is hired as public affairs manager within a firm through these 
theoretical lenses. We posit that different professional backgrounds of a manager increase the 
capability of the firm to provide different types of information. In this vein, we expect to see 
more variation in terms of career paths with respect to the US, and less revolving doors. 
Drawing on a sequence analysis of an original data set collected mainly from LinkedIn of almost 
300 EU affairs managers’ career paths across 26 countries, we find out that managers have three 
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types of professional background: private sector, national political sector and EU institutions and 
public affairs. This is in line with expectations from our management approach to revolving 
doors, which suggest that as EU institutions need different types of information, companies are 
incentivised to hire managers with different professional backgrounds. Significantly, we show 
that personnel exchange between EU institutions and business is rarer than revolving doors 
discussions would lead us to believe and that EU affairs managers’ careers are rather static and 
that there is a neat separation between private and public careers. As such, we see the public 
affairs process in the EU as more a sliding doors phenomenon than a Brussels-based one of 
revolving doors involving European experts from EU institutions and satellite European 
organizations and associations.  
A Political Economy Approach to Revolving Doors  
In the US, business has consistently played a public role, similar to other developed countries 
(Vogel 1978). This public role has taken place mainly at an individual level, with a tradition of 
businessmen sitting in key government positions inaugurated with the New Deal (Vogel 1996a; 
Vogel 1996b; Vogel 1978). Until the 1960s, this phenomenon was more circumscribed, confined 
to the very high ranks of business and government (Vogel 1978). But in the 1970s, the increase 
in the competences of the federal government (Vogel 1996a; Vogel 1996b; Hillman et al. 1999) 
and the professionalization of corporate political activity (Vogel 1978; Yoffie & Bergenstein 
1985; Martin 1994) widened the scope of this phenomenon. Managers with legal, public 
relations and first-hand government experience started to enter major companies at all levels 
(Yoffie & Bergenstein 1985). Since then, personnel exchange between the public and the private 
sector has been a predominant feature of business-government relations in the US, receiving 
formal recognition with the label ‘revolving doors’. Currently, half of the lobbyists in 
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Washington have working experience in the federal government (LaPira & Thomas 2014). This 
is confirmed by other works. Lazarus et al. (2016) find that in the US from 1976 to 2012 a 
quarter and almost a third of respectively House members and senators became lobbyists, with 
this trend increasing over time. Finally, Cain & Drutman (2014) demonstrate that roughly a fifth 
of staff leaving the Congress became lobbyists. 
Presumably because it has always been considered congenital to the capitalist state in the US, the 
phenomenon of revolving doors only started to be studied in a consistent manner in the 1980s, 
mainly from a political economy perspective. Studies of revolving doors have focused on how 
individual incentives affect regulatory behaviour. These works identify two types of revolving 
doors dynamics: ex ante and ex post (Gormley 1979; Dal Bo 2006)1. Despite the different 
underlying dynamics, these forms of revolving doors elicit the same consequence on regulatory 
behaviour: regulatory capture. In other words, regulators with prospective or previous experience 
in a regulated sector tend to be more supportive of that sector.  
The prospect of working for the private sector alters the willingness to pursue the objectives of 
the government against those of the firm (Che 1995). The incentives at stake are mainly 
monetary (Quirk 1981; Adams 1982). As emphasized in one of the most important works in this 
field: “It is documented that regulators with five years’ public service can triple their salaries just 
by stepping out the revolving door” (Newsweek, 1989, in Che, 1995 p. 393). This has been 
empirically demonstrated in more recent studies (Blanes i Vidal et al. 2012; Cain & Drutman 
2014). Previous work experience in the private sector elicits the same consequence (Gormley 
1979). The dynamics at play span from the hard core logrolling proposed by traditional political 
science literature to the softer versions proposed by socialization and elite background theories 
(Mills 1961; Domhoff 1967; Miliband 1969; Putnam 1976; Navarro 1982; Zingales 2012).  
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Findings show that revolving doors in both forms lead to a positive attitude of regulators towards 
the regulated industry. The two most cited empirical analyses of this process, Gormley (1979) 
and Cohen (1986), investigate the impact of revolving doors on voting behaviour in the US 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Both find that regulators with previous experience 
in the private sector tend to be more in favour of the industry at the beginning of their terms with 
the reverse true for those with future experience in the private sector. The very same dynamics 
have been demonstrated to also take place in public administrations (Trondal et al. 2015). Recent 
works from a more interest group politics perspective confirm that hiring covered officials (the 
official definition of revolving doors lobbyists in the US) is associated with favourable 
regulation (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Lazarus & McKay 2012). 
A Management Approach to Revolving Doors  
Recent works on revolving doors in the US suggest that companies hire individuals with 
experience in the public sector not because of their expertise but because of their personal 
contacts (Bertrand et al. 2011; Blanes i Vidal et al. 2012; Cain & Drutman 2014; LaPira & 
Thomas 2014; Lazarus et al. 2016). We build on this new perspective for the management 
approach to revolving doors proposed in this work. The management literature focuses on why 
business acts in the political arena, how it does so and what explains its behaviour (Getz 2001). 
Among the several perspectives on CPA, the resource dependence theory, founded on the 
resource-based view of the firm in business studies and organizational theories in sociology, is 
the most commonly used approach (Getz 2001; McWilliams et al. 2002; Hillman et al. 2004). 
The main argument is that firms act in the political arena because they need something from the 
public authority, which may be access to the decision-making process or direct revenues. In so 
doing, they exchange resources with the public authority.  
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We apply this management perspective in order to shed light on the revolving doors dynamics at 
play in the EU. In the US companies hire managers with experience in the private sector because 
they provide something which is crucial for the company to gain access to the government: 
personal contacts. Yet in the EU the political currency is not personal contacts but information 
(Eising 2007). By building on a resource dependence perspective, the mainstream approach to 
EU (corporate) lobbying, namely the theory of access, suggests that companies adopt different 
strategies in order to exchange different types information with EU institutions.  
The theory of access (Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2004; Eising 2007) studies the interaction between 
the demand side, namely European institutions, and the supply side, namely companies, from a 
resource dependence perspective. Companies provide decision-makers with information in 
exchange for access (Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2004). The venue and degree of access is 
determined mainly by the goodness of fit between the resources provided by companies and the 
institutional opportunities (Eising 2007). The latter in turn derive from the internal arrangements 
and competences of European institutions. Several other studies confirm the centrality of 
information provision in the EU lobbying system (Chalmers 2011; Klüver 2012). 
Bouwen (2002) demonstrates that, to differing degrees, European institutions need three types of 
information: domestic encompassing interest, European encompassing interest, and, expert 
knowledge (Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2004). Business provides these types of information by 
using different strategies. Direct action is associated with the provision of expert knowledge, 
whereas collective action at national and European level provides, respectively, information on 
domestic encompassing and European encompassing information.  
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We conceive the creation of a public affairs role in the firm and who is appointed therein as a 
form of CPA and, as such, we investigate it from a resource dependence perspective. The 
creation of a public affairs role specifically in charge of the relationship with the EU represents 
the first step to convey certain information to EU institutions. Furthermore, the choice of 
appointment to that role can also be seen in this light. In line with the theory of access, we posit 
that individuals from specific backgrounds can substantially increase the capability of a firm to 
provide specific types of information. An official with working experience in the EU institutions 
increases the capability of a firm to provide information about the European encompassing 
interest, whereas an official coming from national authorities can provide the firm with 
information capability with respect to domestic encompassing interest. Finally, experience in the 
private sector can arguably be associated with the provision of expert knowledge.  
This new perspective leads to expectations on revolving doors in the EU which differ from those 
suggested by media headlines and from what happens on the other side of the Atlantic. We 
expect to observe limited levels of revolving doors in the EU. In fact, for companies, different 
types of information represent valuable resources to be exchanged for access to the decision-
making process and only some of them are associated with working experience in EU 
institutions. Companies also need information on interests at domestic level and expert 
knowledge to access the European decision-making process. Accordingly, we expect firms to 
hire managers with working experience in EU institutions but also managers with experience in 
the private sector and in national authorities.  
This management approach to revolving doors elicits two main implications: the normalization 
of the phenomenon of revolving doors and the cross-fertilization between the American 
management and EU lobbying scholarships. First, this study emphasizes the importance of 
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studying this phenomenon by treating it as a form of CPA and not as something unique. The 
management literature itself has recently emphasized the necessity to expand the study of CPA to 
forms other than the conventional ones (Hillman et al. 2004; Lawton et al. 2013). Second, EU 
lobbying scholars have mainly focused on the action of the firm in terms of access to European 
institutions (Bouwen 2002; Broscheid & Coen 2003; Mahoney 2004; Broscheid & Coen 2007; 
Vannoni 2015) and the presence of EU affairs offices (Bernhagen & Mitchell 2009). By building 
on one of the mainstream approaches to EU lobbying, this project shifts the focus to management 
decisions on who within firms actually represents them vis-à-vis the EU.  
Before we introduce the unique dataset on which the study relies, two caveats are needed. First, 
how the institutional differences between the EU and the US shape the individual incentives of 
the regulator/manager, should not be overlooked. For instance, the permeability of the federal 
state and the wage differential between public and private sectors in the US increase individual 
incentives to step into revolving doors. Conversely, EU bureaucrats have permanent contracts 
with good benefits and usually show a strong sense of belonging to the EU community. This 
focus on individual incentives can explain why the phenomenon of revolving doors is perhaps 
more noticeable for those moving from high-ranking but temporary fix term positions, such as 
Commissioners (CEO 2015). Yet, this perspective can only account for whether and to what 
extent the phenomenon of revolving doors is present, not for where managers come from. The 
management approach based on the resource dependence theory used in this work is hence more 
explanatorily powerful, as it provides a compelling argument on the professional background of 
public affairs managers which encompasses but goes beyond the revolving doors debate. For 
instance, this approach accounts also for multi-level revolving doors, namely the personnel 
exchange between public authorities at difference levels of governance and the private sector. 
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Second, this work focuses on in-house public affairs managers, not private lobbyists. It might be 
argued that revolving doors is in place mainly for the latter, which are not studied in this work. 
Indeed, recent work in the US finds a significant difference between private and in-house 
lobbyists: the former are more likely to come from the public sector (LaPira & Thomas 2014) 
and the great majority of those who leave the legislature tend to work as private lobbyists as a 
first job (Lazarus et al. 2016). Yet, it has been demonstrated that the use of consultants and 
private lobbyists is less common in the EU (Coen 1997; Coen 1998; Kohler-Koch & Quittkat 
1999). Accordingly, if personal contacts also represented important resources in the EU, we 
would observe the phenomenon of revolving doors for in-house public affairs managers. 
Data and Measurement 
The analysis relies on a dataset with all the public and private companies politically active in the 
EU in the past ten years2. Observations are drawn from various sources from different years: the 
EU Transparency Register (CEC 2014), various semi-public directories (EA 2006; EA 2007; EA 
2008b; EA 2008a; DODs 2014) and a dataset from other authors (Wonka et al. 2010). The EU 
Transparency Register is close in spirit to the lobbying register in the US: it contains up to date 
information on the interests represented at the EU level and who represents them. Semi-public 
directories range from those providing information on the interests involved in specific sectors 
and in different years (EA 2006; EA 2007; EA 2008b; EA 2008a) to those providing up to date 
information on the companies active in the EU in all sectors (DODs 2014). Finally, the dataset 
presented in Wonka et al. (2010) gathers information on the interests represented at EU level 
from a wide array of sources, including previous versions of the directories mentioned above. 
We cross check observations from all these sources, while dropping doubles and retaining only 
public and private companies. The result is a dataset of 512 (economically active) public and 
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private companies based in 32 countries and 13 sectors, ranging in size from a few employees to 
hundreds of thousands of people3. 
We then check whether the companies in the dataset are still active politically in the EU and 
identify public affairs managers through the 2014 DOD’s European Public Affairs Directory 
(DODs 2014) and the EU Transparency Register (CEC 2014). Those individuals registered as in 
charge of EU public affairs for the respective company are individuated4. Where more 
individuals are mentioned we check across sources to identify a single one. Information on their 
professional background is then drawn from professional social networks, such as LinkedIn5, as 
well as from corporate, personal and public affairs/business websites, such as European Agenda 
and Bloomberg Business. Information is gathered on their current role and their previous 
occupations. The final dataset contains 325 public affairs managers, 297 of which include 
information on their professional background. 
Research Design 
Although several methods might be used to analyze career data, such as time series analysis, we 
propose sequence analysis (Blanchard 2005; Brzinsky-Fay et al. 2006; Blanchard 2011; 
Blanchard et al. 2014). Sequence analysis is compatible with two fundamental aspects of career 
data: their temporal and categorical aspects. In contrast to the data dealt with by time series 
analysis, career data are categorical, and most importantly, they are often measured across time 
points not equally distant from one another. Unlike traditional time series analysis, sequence 
analysis is compatible with observations measured across relative rather than absolute points in 
time (Brzinsky-Fay et al. 2006). Originating in labor market sociology (Abbott & Hrycak 1990; 
Abbott 1991; Halpin & Cban 1998; Blair‐Loy 1999; Halpin 2007) sequence analysis has only 
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very recently started to be applied in political science and more specifically in political elite 
studies (Blanchard 2005; Tepe & Marcinkiewicz 2013; Jäckle 2016). Nonetheless, no application 
of sequence analysis is present in business elite studies.  
Sequence analysis is a toolkit comprising data mining, descriptive and statistics tools. In this 
work we use what is considered to be the standard practice in conducting sequence analysis. We 
start by illustrating descriptive statistics on the frequencies of elements along the sequences, 
namely on the occupational background of EU affairs managers across the steps in their career 
paths. In this way we describe EU affairs managers’ career paths and how they evolve across 
career steps. Then, we calculate the distances across sequences and cluster those distances in 
order to obtain ideal-typical career paths. Finally, we shift the attention from single states to 
transitions (between states) within sequences by investigating the most discriminant transitions 
in each cluster. We do so by using the TraMineR package in R (Gabadinho et al. 2010a; 
Gabadinho et al. 2010b; Gabadinho et al. 2011; Studer et al. 2011)6.  
The method used in this work to calculate distances across sequences is called Optimal 
Matching, which compares sequences on the basis of an algorithm first used in biology 
(Needleman & Wunsch 1970). This algorithm compares sequences by pairs of states and 
calculates a distance index based on the replacement of different elements (Brzinsky-Fay et al. 
2006; Blanchard 2011; Blanchard et al. 2014). In other words, it calculates the distance between 
two sequences as the cost to transform one into the other by considering the insertion/deletion 
and substitution of elements (Studer et al. 2011). We acknowledge that several methods based on 
different algorithms are available (Studer et al. 2011), but Optimal Matching represents standard 
practice in sequence analysis. It is common practice in sequence analysis to proceed by 
clustering similar sequences into clusters/groups by using the distance matrix calculated with 
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Optimal Matching. Although different methods are present, we employ the most common 
method, hierarchical clustering. By starting from single sequences, the clustering process 
aggregates them into groups/clusters of similar sequences (i.e. less distant based on the matrix 
above). The process continues until a definite amount of groups/clusters is obtained. These 
groups/clusters are the ‘ideal-typical’ sequences, which show recurrent patterns in the sample 
(Abbott & Hrycak 1990; Abbott 1991). Finally, we move the attention from states to transitions. 
Sequences can be analysed in terms of single states or transitions between single states. In the 
final part of the analysis we look at those transitions that discriminate significantly the 
groups/clusters obtained using the method discussed above.  
A Career Path Analysis of EU Affairs Managers 
We start by showing descriptive statistics, derived with the TraMineR R package (Gabadinho et 
al. 2010a; Gabadinho et al. 2011; Studer et al. 2011; Studer 2013), to illustrate the career paths of 
EU affairs managers. Figure 1 shows the distribution plot of the frequency of each occupation for 
each step in the career path of EU managers (close in spirit to a traditional stacked bar chart). 
The horizontal axis shows the various steps in the managers’ career paths, from type6, the most 
distant in time, to type1, the most recent previous occupation. We code the professional 
background of EU managers according to eight categories: firm (including also previous 
occupation in the same firm), association, PR/public affairs/law firm/journalist, research 
center/think tank/NGO, (sub-)national authority, EU institution, other supranational organization 
and army7. 
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Figure 1 Sequence Analysis: State Distribution Plot 
 
Some preliminary findings can be drawn from Figure 1. First, we can see that the most frequent 
previous occupation is in the private sector and the second most frequent is in PR/public affairs 
companies, followed by (sub-)national authorities. Jobs in the private sector account for half of 
the total at the very beginning, increasing to approximately 70 per cent towards the end of the 
career path (in type1, namely the most recent previous occupation). This is explained by the fact 
that several EU affairs managers come from inside the firm, where they have undergone a long 
career. Indeed, when we disaggregate the firm category into two subcategories, namely same 
firm against different firm, we see that although at the beginning of the career path the presence 
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of experience in other firms is prevalent, over time the presence of experience in the same firm 
increases until it becomes the most prevalent occupation type. Almost half of the managers in the 
sample were in the same firm previously. Relatedly, although working experience outside the 
private sector accounts for half of the managers’ professional background at the beginning of 
their career, it significantly decreases towards the end. 
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that working experience in EU institutions is not predominant. 
Only 32 managers have working experience in one of the EU institutions; approximately 10 per 
cent of the sample. This contrasts strongly to the US where roughly half of lobbyists have 
working experience in the public sector at federal level (LaPira & Thomas 2014). Furthermore, 
working experience in the EU is rather distant in time from the current job, suggesting that even 
when the phenomenon of revolving doors is in place EU officials are not parachuted into EU 
affairs offices within companies. This, again, is in stark contrast with the US where revolving 
door lobbyists start to work for the private sector in either the same year they leave or during the 
following one (Lazarus et al. 2016). This is further discussed below where we focus on how 
frequently the direct transition from the public to the private sector (and vice versa) occurs in the 
sample. 
 
What comes out from Figure 1 is that EU affairs managers start their careers in the private sector 
or in PR and public affairs agencies and then gain (more) experience in the private sector. They 
have to climb the ladder inside the firm. This is also confirmed by the fact that on average the 
managers in the sample have spent six years in their current positions, with some having stayed 
there for more than 15 years. Hence, while their initial background is rather variegated, 
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managers’ experience becomes more common with time. Despite some experience in PR and 
public affairs as well as in national authorities, EU affairs managers have careers which are not 
so different from other middle level managers.  
 
We proceed to investigate the empirically observable implications of the arguments put forward 
above. By conceiving revolving doors within a broader management approach to CPA we posit 
above that EU affairs managers provide firms with resources indispensable to gaining access to 
the decision-making system. As put forward by the theory of access, in the EU the most valuable 
resources for firms are information about European and domestic interests along with expert 
knowledge. We argue that the working experience of managers in the EU, national authorities 
and the private sector is associated with the provision of these types of information. In this vein, 
we expect to observe three ideal-typical career paths across EU affairs managers: the first 
comprises mostly of experience in the private sector, the second comprises mostly of experience 
in national authorities and the third experience in EU institutions. 
 
We calculate the distance matrix between sequences and by clustering it we obtain representative 
sequences. The results of the clustering process are shown in Figure 2. We find three ideal-
typical career paths8. Managers falling into the first group have, in relative terms, more 
experience in national authorities. Interestingly, we observe that working experience in European 
institutions and PR/public affairs is clustered together in the second group. Significantly, this 
means that those managers with experience in European institutions also tend to have experience 
in PR and public affairs. The third group contains managers with high experience in the private 
sector.  
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Figure 2 Sequence Analysis: State Distribution Plots of the Clusters 
 
We find empirical evidence for the presence of the three ideal-typical EU affairs managers 
hypothesized above. The first one has experience mainly at national level, either in national or 
subnational government: we label this National. The second ideal-typical EU manager is more 
European and public affairs professional: he or she has experience in EU institutions and/or in 
PR companies and hence we call this European/Professional. Finally, the third ideal-typical 
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manager is a manager with experience in the private sector, especially in his/her own firm: we 
label this Private. In conclusion, we find empirical evidence which supports the claims put 
forward above. The three representative career paths obtained through clustering are those 
suggested by the management approach to revolving doors presented above.  
 
A few remarks are needed. Firstly, working experience in PR/public affairs companies is rather 
common and is clustered with working experience in EU institutions. This suggests that 
information on European encompassing interests can be obtained either through working 
experience in EU institutions or in public affairs companies working in the EU. Presumably, 
given the disincentives to move from the public to the private sector in the EU underlined above, 
individuals become expert in the EU public policy process indirectly, namely by working for 
public affairs companies which work on EU affairs instead of in EU institutions themselves. 
 
Secondly, it should be noted that common trends are present across career paths. For instance, 
the presence of working experience in the private sector increases as we get closer to the final 
position in the government affairs office. This means that, in general, EU managers need to have 
experience in a private working environment and more specifically in their own firms before 
graduating to the senior posts in EU government affairs. This disconfirms the common 
perception in Brussels that public affairs managers are parachuted into firms.  
 
We proceed by investigating the most discriminating transitions (and states) between clusters. 
Findings in Figure 3 provide further confirmation for our claims. First of all, we find that the 
most frequent transitions we expect to take place across career paths according to our claims 
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vary in a statistically significant manner across clusters and do so in accordance to our theory. 
One of the transition of interest, namely from Firm to PR/Public Affairs, is positively correlated 
with the group European/Professional and negatively with the group National. This also holds 
true for single states. As can be seen, the presence of the state Firm is positively associated with 
Private but negatively with European/Professional. The presence of the state PR/public affairs is 
positively associated with European/Professional and negatively with Private. In conclusion, it 
should be noted how sequences are strongly clustered into the three groups theorized, both in 
terms of single states and transitions. Contradicting the common belief, career paths in Brussels 
are rather static and a neat separation between them is present. 
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Figure 3 Sequence Analysis: Discriminating Transitions across Clusters 
 
The focus on transitions is particularly interesting in testing the revolving doors argument. We 
calculate the frequency of transitions from Firm to EU Institution and from EU Institution to 
Firm in the dataset. The former appears once, whereas the latter appears nine times: in total the 
direct exchange of personnel between EU institutions and firms occurs only 10 times in the 
dataset. The second transition containing EU institutions is with PR/Public affairs, which appears 
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nine times in total. This provides further evidence for the limited exchange of personnel between 
EU institutions and business and for the finding above that working experience in public affairs 
companies is a ‘surrogate’ for working experience in EU institutions. 
 
The low presence of exchange of personnel between business and EU institutions calls into 
question the revolving doors phenomenon in the EU. Several leading media commentators and 
NGOs lament the unregulated flow of staff between major companies and EU institutions. We 
find that this is not the case for managers in EU affairs offices. Rather, our findings suggest a 
more complex picture of career paths in EU affairs and we put forward the concept of sliding 
doors9. This term goes beyond referring to the very low personnel exchange between the EU and 
business, a fact which is interesting in itself. Sliding doors point to the static character of 
managers’ careers. Indeed, as seen above, just three career paths represent more than two thirds 
of the managers in the sample and the division between them is rather neat. For instance, the 
chances of moving from a PR/public affairs company or EU institutions to certain firms are very 
low: there is a neat separation between careers in Brussels and especially between public and 
private ones. The reason lies in the specialization of managers: some of them focus on the EU 
public policy process, whereas others on the national one. Others again specialize in expert 
knowledge of the core competences of the firm/industry in which they work. Different working 
experiences are associated with different skills which require years to acquire and which 
represent valuable resources for companies. This aspect can only be accounted for by a broader 
approach to revolving doors, such as the management one proposed in this work. 
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Conclusion 
Washington is always depicted as a grey area of people going back and forth between business 
and governmental bodies: the term revolving doors entered the political dictionary many decades 
ago. We demonstrate that this is not the case in Brussels, as there is a neat separation between 
careers and especially between those in the public and in the private sectors: we put forward the 
concept of sliding doors to account for this phenomenon.  
 
The management approach used in this work suggests that in the US managers with experience 
in the private sector bring their personal contacts to the firm, which they then use to gain access 
to the decision-making process. In the EU, the political currency is information, namely what 
you know and not who you know. Managers specialize in the provision of different types of 
information, which are extremely valuable resources for companies. Since EU institutions 
demand different types of information, there are incentives for companies to hire managers with 
different professional experiences, which is why we observe more variation across career paths 
and less revolving doors in Brussels. Furthermore, this process of specialization of managers in 
the provision of certain information takes years. As such, strong individual disincentives are 
present to change career path which explains the static nature of EU affairs managers’ career 
paths. This forms the basis of what we call sliding doors.  
Not only does this work provide the first large N study on revolving doors in the EU, hence 
suggesting a completely new research agenda, it also speaks to different scholarships. Although 
the term revolving doors has entered the political debate at EU level within the last few years, 
little if any academic attention has been paid to this phenomenon. In this work, we suggest a new 
research agenda to understand the different varieties of business and government relations at 
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micro level and the different types of doors between the public and the private sectors which may 
emerge. Finally, the approach used in this work treats the phenomenon of revolving doors as a 
form of corporate political activity and as such we analyse it from a resource dependence 
perspective. The latter has been used extensively in both American management and European 
interest group politics literature and this work aims to encourage more cross-fertilization between 
these two scholarships.   
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Web-Appendix 
Table 1 Frequency Table 
 type1    type2   type3   type4   type5   type6 
Firm 0.7138 0.6154 0.481 0.5252 0.473 0.483 
Association 0.0875 0.0923 0.077 0.0432 0.043 0.017 
 
PR/public 
affairs/law 
firm/journalist 
0.0875 0.1385 0.216 0.2014 0.258 0.300 
 
Research 
center/think 
tank/NGO 
0.0236 0.0269 0.029 0.0216 0.054 0.067 
 
(Sub-
)National 
Authority 
0.0505 0.0846 0.106 0.1295 0.118 0.133 
 
EU Institution 0.0269 0.0269 0.067 0.0432 0.032 0.000 
 
Other 
Supranational 
Organization 
0.0067 0.0115 0.024 0.0288 0.000 0.000 
 
Army 0.0034 0.0038 0.000 0.0072 0.022 0.000 
 
TOT 297    
 
260    208    139     93     60 
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1 It should be noted that further differences are identified by the literature. One of them is between direct and indirect 
employment (Gormley, 1979), such as when we see in-house lobbyists working directly for a firm or private lobbyists working 
for a PR or public affairs agency under contract by that firm (LaPira and Thomas, 2014). Another difference is between past or 
future public employment and personal service (Getz, 1993, Hillman et al., 1999). The latter refers to a firm representative 
serving in a political capacity, such as sitting on a legislative committee, while working for that firm at the same time. 
2 The data gathering process was carried out throughout 2014 and 2015. 
3 We use AMADEUS (BvD, 2014) definition of public and private company, which excludes lawyers and social enterprises, for 
instance, and we check therein whether they are still economically active. 
4 Each company in the EU Transparency Register needs to provide details on the ‘Person in charge of EU relations’ and the 2014 
DOD’s European Public Affairs Directory provides a list of all the individuals in charge of in-house EU public affairs. 
5 LinkedIn and other professional social networks have been increasingly used for research purposes over the past few years 
(Barron, 2011; LaPira and Thomas, 2014). The use of professional social networks throws up some validity issues. For instance, 
during the past few decades there has been an increase in the use of grand and authoritative job titles on LinkedIn, which in 
reality are not as significant (Schumpeter, 2010). Nonetheless, in this work we are only interested in where the managers have 
worked and not in their positions. Furthermore, the validity of self-reported information on LinkedIn is arguably higher than in 
surveys, the use of which has been common practice so far in this field. Indeed, information on LinkedIn is subject to the scrutiny 
of hundreds of individuals who personally and/or professionally know the manager. 
6 We follow the instructions and sample scripts in these works to run the analysis in R. 
7 Table 1 in the online appendix reports the frequencies on which Figure 1 relies. 
8 The R squared for this clustering is 0.64. 
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9 The concept sliding doors refers to the strong division between managers’ careers and between public and private careers in 
Brussels. In the EU, present career choices restrain the range of future career opportunities instead of widening it, in contrast to 
the revolving doors in the US. 
